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Abstract- A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a 
collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with 
each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and 
maintaining connections in a decentralized manner. 
Security remains a major challenge for these networks 
due to their features of open medium, dynamically 
changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms, 
absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack of 
clear lines of defense. Most of the routing protocols for 
MANETs are thus vulnerable to various types of attacks. 
Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) is a 
very popular routing algorithm. However, it is 
vulnerable to the well-known black hole attack, where a 
malicious node falsely advertises good paths to a 
destination node during the route discovery process. 
This attack becomes more sever when a group of 
malicious nodes cooperate each other. In this paper, a 
defense mechanism is presented against a coordinated 
attack by multiple black hole nodes in a MANET. The 
simulation carried out on the proposed scheme has 
produced results that demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the mechanism in detection of the attack while 
maintaining a reasonable level of throughput in the 
network. 
Keywords- Mobile ad hoc network (MANET), 
Blackhole, Packet dropping, Malicious node, Routing. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A MANET is a collection of wireless hosts that can be 
rapidly deployed as a multi-hop packet radio network 
without the aid of any established infrastructure or 
centralized administrator. Such networks can be used 
to enable next generation battlefield applications, 
including situation awareness systems for 
maneuvering war fighters, and remotely deployed 
unmanned micro-sensor networks. MANETs have 
some special characteristic features such as unreliable 
wireless media (links) used for communication 
between hosts, constantly changing network 
topologies and memberships, limited bandwidth, 
battery, lifetime, and computation power of nodes etc. 
While these characteristics are essential for the 
flexibility of MANETs, they introduce specific 
security concerns that are absent or less severe in 
wired networks. MANETs are vulnerable to various 
types of attacks. These include passive eavesdropping, 
active interfering, impersonation, and denial-of-
service. Intrusion prevention measures such as strong 
authentication and redundant transmission can be used 
to improve the security of an ad hoc network. 
However, these techniques can address only a subset 
of the threats. Moreover, they are costly to implement. 
The dynamic nature of ad hoc networks requires that 
prevention techniques should be complemented by 
detection techniques, which monitor security status of 
the network and identify malicious behavior. 
One of the most critical problems in MANETs is 
the security vulnerabilities of the routing protocols. A 
set of nodes in a MANET may be compromised in 
such a way that it may not be possible to detect their 
malicious behavior easily. Such nodes can generate 
new routing messages to advertise non-existent links, 
provide incorrect link state information, and flood 
other nodes with routing traffic, thus inflicting 
Byzantine failure in the network. One of the most 
widely used routing protocols in MANETs is the ad 
hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing 
protocol [1]. It is a source initiated on-demand routing 
protocol. However, AODV is vulnerable to the well-
known black hole attack. In [2], the authors have 
assumed that the black hole nodes in a MANET do 
not work as a group and have proposed a solution to 
identify a single black hole. However, their proposed 
method cannot be applied to identify a cooperative 
black hole attack involving multiple malicious nodes. 
In this paper, a mechanism is proposed to identify 
multiple black hole nodes cooperating as a group in 
an ad hoc network. The proposed technique works 
with slightly modified AODV protocol and makes use 
of the data routing information table (Section III) in 
addition to the cached and current routing table. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II discusses some related work in security 
mechanism in routing for MANETs. Section III gives 
an overview of AODV protocol and the cooperative 
black hole attack. Section IV describes the proposed 
security protocol and the associated algorithm. 
Section V presents the important results obtained in 
simulation. Section VI concludes the paper while 
highlighting some future scope of work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
    The problem of security and cooperation 
enforcement has received considerable attention by 
researchers in the ad hoc network community. In this 
section, some of these contributions are presented. 
     The problem of securing the routing layer using 
cryptographically secure messages is addressed by Hu 
et al. [3], Papadimitratos and Haas [4], and Sanzgiri et 
al. [5]. Schemes to handle authentication in ad hoc 
networks assuming trusted certificate authorities have 
been proposed by Kong et al. [6]. Hubaux et al. [7] 
have employed a self-organized PGP-based scheme to 
authenticate nodes using chains of certificates and 
transitivity of trust. Stajano and Anderson [8] 
authenticate users by imprinting in analogy to 
ducklings acknowledging the first moving subject 
they see as their mother.  
    In contrast to securing the routing layer of ad hoc 
networks, some researchers have also focused on 
simply detecting and reporting misleading routing 
misbehavior. Watchdog and Pathrater [9] use 
observation-based techniques to detect misbehaving 
nodes, and report observed misbehavior back to the 
source of the traffic. Pathrater manages trust and route 
selection based on these reports. This allows nodes to 
choose better paths along which to route their traffic 
by routing around the misbehaving nodes. However, 
the scheme does not punish malicious nodes; instead, 
they are relieved of their packet forwarding burden. 
    CONFIDANT [10] detects misbehaving nodes by 
means of observation and more aggressively informs 
other nodes of this misbehavior through reports sent 
around the network. Each node in the network hosts a 
monitor for observations, reputation records for first-
hand and trusted second-hand reports, trust records to 
control the trust assigned to the received warnings, 
and a path manager used by nodes to adapt their 
behavior according to reputation information. 
Subsequent research has found that reputation 
schemes can be beneficial for fast misbehavior 
detection, but only when one can deal with false 
accusations [11].  
    Researchers have also investigated means of 
discouraging selfish routing behavior in ad hoc 
networks, generally through payment schemes [12]. 
These approaches either require the use of tamper-
proof hardware or central bankers to do the 
accounting securely, both of which may not be 
appropriate in some truly ad hoc network scenarios. In 
the per-hop payment scheme proposed by Buttyan and 
Hubaux [14], the payment units are called nuglets and 
reside in a secure tamper-proof module in each node. 
They have observed that given such a module, 
increased cooperation is beneficial not only for the 
entire network but also for individual nodes. The 
scheme can result in unfairness to some hosts, but its 
simplicity and performance may be appropriate in 
some cases. 
     Bansal and Baker [13] have proposed a scheme that 
relies on first-hand observations. Directly observed 
positive behavior increases the rating of a node, while 
directly observed negative behavior decreases it by an 
amount larger than that is used for positive increments. If 
the rating of a node dips below the faulty threshold, the 
node is added to a faulty list. The faulty list is appended to 
the route request by each node broadcasting it to be used 
as a list of nodes to be avoided. A route is rated good or 
bad depending on whether the next hop is on the faulty 
list. If the next hop of a route is in the faulty list, the route 
is rated as bad. As a response to misbehavior of a node, all 
traffic from that node is rejected. A second chance 
mechanism for redemption employs a timeout after an idle 
period. After a timeout, the node is removed from the 
faulty list with its rating remaining unchanged.  
     Sen et al. have presented a scheme for detection of 
malicious packet dropping nodes in a MANET [14]. The 
mechanism is based on local misbehavior detection and 
flooding of the detection information in a controlled 
manner in the network so that the malicious node is 
detected even if moves out a local neighborhood. 
    Deng, Li and Agarwal [2] have suggested a 
mechanism of defense against black hole attack in ad 
hoc networks. In their proposed scheme, as soon as 
the RouteReply packet is received from one of the 
intermediate nodes, another RouteRequest is sent from 
the source node to a neighbor node of the intermediate 
node in the path. This is to ensure that such a path 
exists from the intermediate node to the destination 
node. For example, let the source node S send 
RouteRequest packets and receive RouteReply through 
the intermediate malicious node M. The RouteReply 
packet of M contains information regarding its next-
hop neighbor node. Let it contain information about 
the neighbor E. Then, the source node S sends 
FurtherRouteRequest packets to this neighbor node E. 
Node E responds by sending a FurtherRouteReply 
packet to source node S. Since node M is a malicious 
node, and thus not present in the routing list of node 
E, the FurtherRouteReply packet sent by node E will 
not contain a route to the malicious node M. But if it 
contains a route to the destination node D, then the 
new route to the destination through node E is 
selected, and the earlier selected route through node 
M is rejected. While this scheme completely 
eliminates the black hole attack by a single attacker, it 
fails completely in identifying a cooperative black 
hole attack involving multiple malicious nodes.   
    
III. AODV AND ITS SECURITY PROBLEMS 
    In this section, a brief overview of the AODV 
routing protocol is presented and the security threat 
that are associated with this routing protocol are 
briefly discussed. More specifically, the cooperative 
black hole attack on AODV is also described. 
A.    AODV Overview 
    AODV is a reactive routing protocol that does not 
require maintenance of routes to destination nodes 
that are not in active communication. Instead, it 
allows mobile nodes to quickly obtain routes to new 
destination nodes. Every mobile node maintains a 
routing table that stores the next hop node information 
for a route to the destination node. When a source 
node wishes to route a packet to a destination node, it 
uses the specified route if a fresh enough route to the 
destination node is available in its routing table. If 
such a route is not available in its cache, the node 
initiates a route discovery process by broadcasting a 
RouteRequest (RREQ) message to its neighbors. On 
receiving a RREQ message, the intermediate nodes 
update their routing tables for a reverse route to the 
source node. All the receiving nodes that do not have 
a route to the destination node broadcast the RREQ 
packet to their neighbors. Intermediate nodes 
increment the hop count before forwarding the RREQ. 
A RouteReply (RREP) message is sent back to the 
source node when the RREQ query reaches either the 
destination node itself or any other intermediate node 
that has a current route to the destination. As the 
RREP propagates to the source node, the forward 
route to the destination is updated by the intermediate 
nodes receiving a RREP. The RREP message is a 
unicast message to the source node. 
     AODV uses sequence numbers to determine the 
freshness of routing information and to guarantee 
loop-free routes. In case of multiple routes, a node 
selects the route with the highest sequence number. If 
multiple routes have the same sequence number, then 
the node chooses the route with the shortest hop 
count. Timers are used to keep the route entries fresh. 
    When a link break occurs, RouteError (RERR) 
packets are propagated along the reverse path to the 
source invalidating all broken entries in the routing 
table of the intermediate nodes. AODV also uses 
periodic hello messages to maintain the connectivity 
of neighboring nodes. 
    AODV does not incorporate any specific security 
mechanism, such as strong authentication. Therefore, 
there is no straightforward mechanism to prevent 
mischievous behavior of a node such as MAC 
spoofing, IP spoofing, dropping packets, or altering 
the contents of the control packets. Protocols like 
SAR [15] have been developed to secure AODV 
against certain types of attacks. However, these 
protocols achieve limited security at the cost of 
performance degradation in terms of message 
overhead and latency time. 
 
B.    Cooperative Black Hole Attack 
    The blackhole attack has two phases. In the first phase, 
the malicious node exploits the ad hoc routing protocol 
such as AODV to advertise itself as having a valid route to 
a destination node, with the intention of intercepting 
packets, even though the route is spurious. In the second 
phase, the attacker node drops the intercepted packets 
without forwarding them. There is a more subtle form of 
this attack when an attacker node suppresses or modifies 
packets originating from some nodes, while leaving the 
data packets from other nodes unaffected. This makes it 
difficult for other nodes to detect the malicious node. In 
this work, however, a defense mechanism has been 
proposed against a cooperative blackhole attack in a 
MANET that relies on AODV routing protocol. 
Symbolic notations in Fig. 1 are used in all the 
subsequent diagrams in the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
Fig.1. Symbolic notations used in diagrams 
 
    In the standard AODV protocol, when the source 
node S (Fig. 2) wants to communicate with the 
destination node D, the source node S broadcasts the 
RouteRequest (RREQ) packet. Each neighboring 
active node updates its routing table with an entry for 
the source node S, and checks if it is the destination 
node or whether it has the current route to the 
destination node. If an intermediate node does not 
have the current route to the destination node, it 
updates the RREQ packet by increasing the hop 
count, and floods the network with the RREQ to the 
destination node D until it reaches node D or any 
other intermediate node that has the current route to 
D, as depicted in Fig.2. 
 
Fig.2. Network flooding by RREQ messages 
     
    The destination node D or any intermediate node that 
has the current route to D, initiates a RouteReply (RREP) 
in the reverse direction, as depicted in Fig. 3. Node S 
starts sending data packets to the neighboring node 
that responded first, and discards the other responses. 
This works fine when the network has no malicious 
nodes. 
 
Fig.3. Propagation of RREP messages 
     
    In [2], authors have proposed a solution to identify 
and isolate a single blackhole node. However, the 
security threat arising out of the situation where 
multiple blackhole nodes act in coordination has not 
been addressed. For example, when multiple 
blackhole nodes are acting in coordination with each 
other, the first black hole node B1 refers to one of its 
partners B2 as the next hop, as depicted in Fig. 2. In 
the mechanism propose in [2], the source node S 
sends a FurtherRequest (FRq) to B2 through a 
different route (S-2-4-B2) other than via B1. Node S 
asks B2 if it has a route to node B1 and a route to 
destination node D. Because B2 is cooperating with 
B1, its “FurtherReply (FRp)” will be “yes” to both the 
questions. According to the solution proposed in [2], 
node S starts sending the data packets assuming that 
the route S-B1-B2 is secure. However, in reality, the 
packets are intercepted and then dropped by node B1 
and the security of the network is compromised. 
IV. THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM 
    In this, section the proposed mechanism for defending 
against a cooperative black hole attack is presented. The 
mechanism modifies the AODV protocol by introducing 
two concepts, (i) data routing information (DRI) table and 
(ii) cross checking.   
A.    Data Routing Information 
    In the proposed scheme, two bits of additional 
information are sent by the nodes that respond to the 
Dashed Arrow: RREQ/RREP Packets 
Node: Mobile Host 
Node i has a route to node j and has 
routed data packets through node j 
Nodes i and j have route to each 
other and have routed data packets 
of each other  
A route exists between nodes i and j 
RREQ message of a source node during route discovery 
process. Each node maintains an additional data routing 
information (DRI) table. In the DRI table, the bit 1 stands 
for ‘true’ and the bit 0 stands for ‘false’. The first bit 
‘From’ stands for the information on routing data packet 
from the node (in the Node filed), while the second bit 
‘Through’ stands for information on routing data packet 
through the node (in the Node field). With reference to the 
example depicted in Fig. 3, a sample database maintained 
by node 4 is shown in Table 1. The entry 1 0 for node 3 
implies that node 4 has routed data packets from 3, but has 
not routed any data packets through 3 (before node 3 
moved away from 4). The entry 1 1 for node 6 implies 
that, node 4 has successfully routed data packets from and 
through node 6. The entry 0 0 for node B2 implies that, 
node 4 has not routed any data packets from or through B2. 
TABLE I: DRI table maintained in node 4 
Node # Data Routing  Information 
From Through 
3 1 0 
6 1 1 
B2 0 0 
2 1 1 
 
B.    Cross Checking 
    The proposed scheme relies on reliable nodes (nodes 
through which source has routed data previously and 
knows them to be trustworthy) to transfer data packets. 
The modified AODV protocol and the algorithm for the 
proposed mechanism are depicted in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 
respectively. In the modified protocol, the source node 
(SN) broadcasts a RREQ message to discover a secure 
route to the destination node. The intermediate node 
(IN) that generates the RREP has to provide 
information regarding its next hop node (NHN) and 
its DRI entry for that NHN. Upon receiving the RREP 
message from IN, SN will check its own DRI table to 
see whether IN is its reliable node. If SN has used IN 
before for routing data packets, then IN is a reliable 
node for SN and SN starts routing data through IN. 
Otherwise, IN is unreliable and thus SN sends FRq 
message to NHN to check the identity of the IN, and 
asks NHN about the following information: (i) if IN 
has routed data packets through NHN, (ii) who is the 
current NHN’s next hop to destination, and (iii) has 
the current NHN routed data through its own next 
hop. The NHN, in turn, responds with FRp message 
including the following responses: (i) DRI entry for 
IN, (ii) the information about its (NHN’s) next hop 
node, and (iii) the DRI entry for its (NHN’s) next hop. 
Based on the FRp message from NHN, SN checks 
whether NHN is reliable or not. If SN has routed data 
through NHN before, NHN is reliable; otherwise, 
NHN is unreliable for SN. If NHN is reliable, then SN 
will check whether IN is a blackhole or not. If the 
second bit of the DRI entry from the IN is equal to 1, 
i.e. IN has routed data through NHN, and the first bit 
of the DRI entry from the NHN is equal to 0 i.e. NHN 
has not routed data from IN, then IN is a blackhole. If 
IN is not a blackhole and NHN is a reliable node, then 
the route is secure, and SN will update its DRI entry 
for IN with 0 1, and starts routing data via IN. If IN is 
a blackhole, then SN identifies all the nodes along the 
reverse path from IN to the node that generated the 
RREP as blackhole nodes. Subsequently SN ignores 
any other RREP from the blackholes and broadcasts 
the list of cooperative blackholes in the network. If 
NHN is an unreliable node, SN treats current NHN as 
IN and sends FRq to the updated IN’s next hop node 
and goes on in a loop from steps 7 through 24 in the 
algorithm depicted in Fig. 5. 
 
 
 
Fig.4. Modified AODV protocol to prevent cooperative balckhole attack 
    As an example, let’s consider the network in Fig. 6. 
When node B1 responds to source node S with RREP 
message, it provides its next hop node B2 and DRI for 
the next hop (i.e. if B1 has routed data packets through 
B2). Here the blackhole node (B1) lies about using the 
path by replying with the DRI value equal to 0 1. 
Upon receiving RREP message from B1, the source 
node S checks its own DRI table to see whether B1 is a 
reliable node. Since S has never sent any data through 
B1 before, B1 is not a reliable node to S. Therefore, S 
sends FRq to B2 via alternative path S-2-4-B2 and asks 
B2 about three things: (i) whether B2 has routed any 
data from B1, (ii) who is B2’s next hop, and (iii) 
whether B2 has routed data packets through B2’s next 
hop. Since B2 is maliciously collaborating with B1, it 
replies positively to all the three queries and gives 
node 6 (chosen randomly) as its next hop. When the 
source node contacts node 6 via alternative path S-2-
4-6 to cross check the validity of the claims of node 
B2, node 6 responds negatively. Since node 6 has 
neither a route to node B2 nor it has received data 
packets from node B2, the DRI value corresponding to 
B2 as stored in node 6 is 0 0 as shown in Fig. 6. Based 
on this information, node S can infer that B2 is a 
blackhole node. If node B1 really had routed data 
packets through node B2 before, it should have 
validated the node (B2) before sending it. Now, since 
node B2 is invalidated through node 6, the source node 
S infers that node B1 is maliciously cooperating with 
node B2. Hence both nodes B1 and B2 are marked as 
blackhole nodes and this information is propagated 
throughout leading to the revocation of their 
certificates. Subsequently S discards any further 
responses from B1 or B2 and looks from a valid 
alternative route to D. 
    The process of cross checking the intermediate nodes is 
a one-time procedure which should be affordable for the 
purpose of security. The cost of crosschecking the nodes 
can be minimized by allowing the nodes to share the DRI 
table of their trusted nodes with each other. 
 
Fig.5. Modified AODV algorithm to detect cooperative balckhole attack 
V. SIMULATIONS 
    The experiments for the evaluation of the proposed 
scheme have been carried out using the network 
simulator ns-2. The 802.11 MAC layer implemented 
in ns-2 is used for simulation. An improved version of 
random waypoint model is used as the model of node 
mobility [16]. Performances of the three protocols are 
evaluated: (i) Standard AODV protocol, (ii) AODV 
with two malicious nodes cooperating in a blackhole 
attack, and (iii) AODV with the proposed algorithm. 
The scenarios developed to carry out the tests use two 
parameters: (i) the mobility of the nodes and (ii) the 
number of active connections in the network. The 
chosen parameters for simulation are presented in 
Table II.  
 
 
Figure 6: Detection of multiple black hole nodes in one-time check 
   Following metrics are chosen to evaluate the impact 
of the blackhole attack on the simulated network: (i) 
packet delivery ratio and (ii) false routing packets sent by 
the attacker nodes. These metrics were used to measure 
the severity of the attack and the improvement that the 
scheme manages to achieve during an active attack 
scenario. Every point in the graph (Figs 7-10) is an 
average of the values obtained after the experiment is 
repeated five times. 
TABLE II: Simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
Simulation duration 
Simulation area 
Number of mobile nodes 
Transmission range 
Movement model 
Maximum speed 
Traffic type 
Total number of flows 
Packet rate 
Data payload 
Number of malicious nodes 
Host pause time  
1000 sec 
1000 * 1000 m 
30 
200 m 
Random waypoint 
5 – 20 m /sec 
CBR (UDP) 
15 
2 packets / sec 
512 bytes / packet 
2 
10 sec 
 
    In Fig. 7, the metric packet delivery ratio is plotted 
against the number of active connections. As the total 
number of mobile nodes in the network is 30, the 
maximum number of connections in the network is 
29. A general observation from Fig. 7 is that AODV 
achieves maximum delivery ratio with 10 to 25 active 
connections. However the delivery ratio falls slightly 
when the maximum number of connections (in this 
case 29) is established. The cooperative blackhole 
attack has a very severe impact as it decreases the 
delivery ratio to a value that is even less than half of 
the normal AODV delivery ratio. With the proposed 
scheme, the delivery ratio obtained is around 60%, 
which is a significant improvement over the degraded 
performance of the network under cooperative 
blackhole attack without any security mechanism. 
 
 
 
Fig.7. Packet delivery ratio vs. number of active connections 
 
    In Fig. 8, packet delivery ratio is plotted against the 
mobility of the nodes. It is observed that AODV 
performs better for lower node mobility rates. The 
delivery rate starts dropping with increasing mobility 
of the nodes. The performance of the network 
significantly reduces when AODV is under the 
cooperative blackhole attack, and when the mobility 
of the nodes in the network increases. This behavior 
of the protocol is expected due to the following 
reason. With increasing mobility of the nodes the 
topology of the network changes faster, resulting in 
frequent route request generation. This gives an 
opportunity to a malicious node to send more false 
RREP packets. AODV under blackhole attack 
exhibits a decrease in delivery ratio to 38%. The 
proposed algorithm increases the delivery ratio to 
55%, resulting in an average improvement of 17%. 
    The second metric that is used in the evaluation of the 
attack is the number of false packets sent by the attacker 
nodes versus the number of active connections in the 
network. This metric has been used to examine the 
overhead of the blackhole attack. From Fig. 9, it is 
observed that the average number of false RREPs sent 
by the malicious nodes in all the experiments 
conducted was 2056, and the number of nodes that 
inserted the false route into their routing table was 22 
out of the total 30 nodes. Fig. 10 shows that with the 
increase in the mobility, the number of false RREP 
packets sent by the malicious nodes also increases. 
                                 
 
Fig.8. Delivery ratio vs. nodes’ mobility 
 
 
Fig.9. No. of false replies from attacker nodes vs. no. of connections 
 
 
Fig.10. No. of false replies sent by the attacker nodes vs. nodes’ mobility 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
    In this paper, routing security issues in MANETs are 
discussed in general, and in particular the cooperative 
blackhole attack has been described in detail. A security 
protocol has been proposed that can be utilized to identify 
multiple blackhole nodes in a MANET and thereby 
identify a secure routing path from a source node to a 
destination node avoiding the blackhole nodes. The 
proposed scheme has been evaluated by implementing it 
in the network simulator ns-2, and the results demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the mechanism. As a future scope of 
work, the proposed security mechanism may be extended 
so that it can defend against other attacks like resource 
consumption attack and packet dropping attack. Adapting 
the protocol for efficiently defending against grayhole 
attack- an attack where some nodes switch their states 
from blackhole to honest intermittently and vice versa, is 
also an interesting future work. 
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